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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The Court, by utilizing federal law to establish liability, relieves
federal judges of the task of wading through the quagmire of in-
numerable state approaches to the problem of distinguishing between
what is "governmental" and what is "proprietary." 17 The abandon-
ment of this tenuous distinction serves to broaden federal liability to
a considerable extent, approaching the liberal attitude of the New
York courts.1 8 But perhaps a more important result of this case is
that the Court, without defining discretion, has at last limited its
application, 9 something they refused to do in the Dalehite case.20
That the limitation imposed by the instant case will destroy much of
the importance of the broad definition of the discretionary clause
as propounded in that decision-a construction which has hitherto
thwarted the legislative intent 21-seems to be quite evident. Thus,
after a lapse of ten years marked by judicially superimposed legisla-
tion, the Court has finally agreed to admit that Congress had waived
governmental tort immunity.
X
TORTS - MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO DEFEC-
TIVE PRODUCT - SCOPE OF MacPherson DOCTRINE. - Plaintiff pur-
chased airplanes equipped with latently defective engines. These
17 For examples of the disharmony among the states, see Haley v. Boston,
191 Mass. 291, 77 N.E. 888 (1906). While defendant's employees were col-
lecting ashes from dwelling houses, they ran their cart over the plaintiff's leg.
It was held that the city was not liable since the service performed by the city
was without charge. But the court intimated that the decision would probably
be different if the plaintiff could show that the cart in question had at some time
also carted away steam engine ashes for which the city charged 10 cents a
barrel. See also Williams v. City of New York, 57 N.Y.S.2d 39 (Sup. Ct.
1945); Irvine v. Greenwood, 89 S.C. 511, 72 S.E. 228 (1911); Borchard,
Government Liability In Tort, 34 YALa L.J. 129 (1924).
is See Foley v. New York, 294 N.Y. 275, 62 N.E.2d 69 (1945) (state liable
when negligent failure to replace burned-out bulb in traffic light caused
accident); Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604
(1945) (city held liable in negligence action for damages caused by runaway
police horse).
19 This conclusion is borne out by the recent Supreme Court case of United
States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907, affirming per curiam sub noant.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
There, the Court affirmed a lower court determination that the discretionary
exemption does not shield the Government from liability for the wrongful death
of airline passengers killed in a plane collision caused by the negligent operation
of a Government control tower. In reaching its decision, the Court relied
solely on the instant case. See also Dahlstrom v. United States, 24 U.S.L.
WE.K 2312 (8th Cir. Jan. 10, 1956).
20 "It is unnecessary to define, apart from this case, precisely where dis-
cretion ends." Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 35 (1953).
21 See Leflar, Torts, 1954 ANN. SURVEY Am. L. 549, 573, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rnv.
645, 669 (1955) ; Notes, 23 Go. WAsH. L. REv. 716, 717 (1955), 66 HARV. L.
REv. 488 (1953).
[ VOL. 30
RECENT DECISIONS
defects were discovered after they caused further damage to the
engines while in actual flight. The plaintiff brought a negligence ac-
tion against the manufacturer of the engines and demanded damages
for the cost of removing the defects and repairing the damage to the
engines. The Court dismissed the complaint, holding that, until there
is an accident, there can be no recovery from the manufacturer for
negligence when there is no privity. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
Originally, where there was no privity of contract, a manufacturer
was not liable to third parties for negligence.' Courts quickly recog-
nized the harshness of this rule and allowed a recovery without privity
where the instrumentality was "imminently dangerous" to life or limb.
2
The manufacturer was also held liable when he concealed a known
defect which caused injury to third parties.8 A third exception was
recognized where an owner's negligence caused injuries to one whom
he had invited on his premises to use his defective article. 4 Under
this rule a manufacturer could be held liable.
It remained for Judge Cardozo to extend manufacturers' liability
even further in the leading case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.5
Here recovery was allowed, without privity, for personal injuries
caused by an inherently dangerous article. This decision imposed on
the manufacturer a duty to use reasonable care in the manufacturing
of his product, based upon the foreseeability of harm to subsequent
users.6 The MacPherson case was quickly followed by other Ameri-
can jurisdictions and today is almost universally accepted.7 Massa-
I Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842);
cf. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
2 See Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852) (the leading case); Blood
Balm Co. v. Cooper, 83 Ga. 457, 10 S.E. 118 (1889); Norton v. Sewall, 106
Mass. 143 (1870).
3 See Kuelling v. Roderick Lean Mfg. Co., 183 N.Y. 78, 75 N.E. 1098
(1905); Lewis v. Terry, 111 Cal. 39, 43 Pac. 398 (1896); cf. Langridge v.
Levy, 2 M. & W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Ex. 1837).
4 Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865, 870 (8th Cir. 1903)
(dictum); cf. Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B. 503 (C.A. 1883). See also PRossEa,
ToRTs § 84, at 499 (2d ed. 1955).
5217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
6 "If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place
life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger....
If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be
used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then,
irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a
duty to make it carefully." MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382,
389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916). See PRossER, TORTS §84, at 499-500 (2d ed.
1955) ; James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 778, 798
(1953). But cf. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170,
174 N.E. 441 (1931).
7See, e.g., United States Radiator Corp. v. Henderson, 68 F.2d 87 (10th
Cir. 1933) (semble), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 650 (1934); Johnson v. Cadillac
Motor Car Co., 261 Fed. 878 (2d Cir. 1919) ; Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319
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chusetts, one of the last jurisdictions to adopt the MacPherson
doctrine, abolished the privity rule entirely in extending manufac-
turers' liability.8 The Restatement not only accepts the MacPherson
rule, but is more liberal in scope. It allows recovery for personal
injury and property damage ". . . to those who lawfully use it
[a manufactured chattel] . . .and to those whom the supplier should
expect to be in the vicinity of its probable use... ." England, which
formulated the privity rule, has repudiated the necessity of privity in
a negligence action against the manufacturer and adopted a liberal
theory of liability. 10 New York courts, in various extensions of the
MacPherson rule, held the manufacturer of component parts liable; "
allowed recovery for property damage; 12 and imposed manufacturers'
liability on suppliers and lessors of chattels.' 3 Under the New York
courts' liberal application of the MacPherson rule, almost anything is
found to be inherently dangerous once injury has occurred.' 4
Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946) ; Kalash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co., 1 Cal. 2d
229, 34 P.2d 481, 482 (1934) (dictum). See also PROSsFR, TORTS § 84 (2d ed.
1955); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 388, 395 (1934); Tucker & Kuhn, The Decline
Of The Privity Rule In Tort Liability, 11 U. Pirr. L. REv. 236 (1950); cf.
Robey v. Richmond Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc., 192 Va. 192, 64 S.E2d
723, 727 (1951) (dictum) (question of accepting the MacPherson doctrine left
undecided).
8 See Carter v. Yardley & Co., supra note 7. The ... asserted general
rule no longer exists. In principle it was unsound. It tended to produce unjust
results. It has been abandoned by the great weight of authority elsewhere.
We now abandon it in this Commonwealth." 64 N.E.2d at 700. See Peairs,
The God In The Machine, 29 B.U.L. REv. 37 (1949).
9 RESTATEmENT, TORTS §§ 395, 497 (1934).
10 See Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562; Feezer, Tort Liability Of
Manufacturers, 19 MINN. L. REv. 752, 761 (1935) ; Friedmann, Social Insurance
And The Principles Of Tort Liability, 63 HAgv. L. REv. 241, 243 (1949) ; Miller,
Liability Of A Manufacturer For Harm Done By A Product, 3 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 106, 108 (1951). But cf. Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., 2 K.B. 164
(1951).
11 See Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576 (1932);
Kalinowski v. Truck Equipment Co., 237 App. Div. 472, 261 N.Y. Supp. 657
(4th Dep't 1933), aff'd tnem., 270 N.Y. 532, 200 N.E. 304 (1936).
12 See Genesee County Patrons Fire Relief Ass'n v. L. Sonneborn Sons,
Inc., 263 N.Y. 463, 189 N.E. 551 (1934); Schuylerville Wall Paper Co. v.
American Mfg. Co., 272 App. Div. 856, 70 N.Y.S.2d 166 (3d Dep't 1947) (mem.
opinion).
13 See La Rocca v. Farrington, 301 N.Y. 247, 93 N.E.2d 829 (1950) (per
curiam) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 388, 408 (1934).
14 See, e.g., Hoenig v. Central Stamping Co., 273 N.Y. 485, 6 N.E.2d 415
(1936) (mem. opinion); Moss v. Fred Perlberg, Inc., 29 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup.
Ct. 1941), aff'd, 268 App. Div. 149, 49 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1st Dep't 1944), aff'd
rnem., 294 N.Y. 680, 60 N.E.2d 839 (1945); Cohen v. Dugan Bros., Inc., 132
Misc. 896, 230 N.Y. Supp. 743 (Sup. Ct. 1928); Meditz v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co., 167 Misc. 176, 3 N.Y.S.2d 357 (N.Y. City Ct.), aff'd per curimn,
25 N.Y.S.2d 315 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1938); La Frumento v. Kotex Co., 131
Misc. 314, 226 N.Y. Supp. 750 (N.Y. City Ct. 1928). But see Timpson v.
Marshall, Meadows and Stewart, Inc., 198 Misc. 1034, 101 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup.
Ct. 1950).
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The instant case is a limitation on the MacPherson doctrine since
the nature of the alleged damages, i.e., to the article itself, seems to
be the underlying determinant in denying recovery. 15 The New York
courts, in allowing a recovery for property damage, require an accom-
panying threat to life and limb,16 though there is no valid reason for
drawing such a distinction. 7  Even in view of the New York rule,
however, the defective engines did constitute a threat to life and limb
in the instant case.'8 It is therefore submitted that under the rule of
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. there was no reason for denying a
recovery simply because there was damage only to the property itself.19
Since the manufacturer would be liable had the article caused injury
to persons or property outside of itself, surely liability should be im-
posed for damage to the article alone because such an injury is even
more readily foreseeable. °
The modem trend of judicial and legal thought is directed at
extending manufacturers' liability so that they would respond as guar-
antors on an enterprise liability basis.21 Thus the rationale of the
'1 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 148 N.Y.S.2d
284 (Sup. Ct. 1955). Compare Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., 167 App.
Div. 433, 153 N.Y. Supp. 131 (3d Dep't 1915), uith A.J.P. Contracting Corp.
v. Brooklyn Builders Supply Co., 171 Misc. 157, 11 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Sup.
Ct. 1939), aff'd mem., 258 App. Div. 747, 15 N.Y.S2d 424 (2d Dep't), affd
mem., 283 N.Y. 692, 28 N.E.2d 412 (1940). In Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch
Trans. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936), the Court of Appeals stated:
"Though negligence may endanger the person or property of another, no action-
able wrong is committed if the danger is averted. It is only the injury to person
or property arising from negligence which constitutes an invasion of a personal
right, protected by law, and, therefore, an actionable wrong." Id. at 300,
200 N.E. at 827.
1o Genesee County Patrons Fire Relief Ass'n v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc.,
263 N.Y. 463, 189 N.E. 551 (1934). "We confine our decision to cases in which
the use of the product is imminently dangerous to life and property." Id. at
473, 189 N.E. at 555 (emphasis added).
17 See Spencer v. Madsen, 142 F.2d 820 (10th 'Cir. 1944); United States
Radiator Corp. v. Henderson, 68 F.2d 87 (10th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 292
U.S. 650 (1934). "... There is no reasonable ground for making a distinc-
tion between injury to property and injury to the person." Todd Shipyards
Corp. v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 609, 610 (S.D. Me. 1947). See also
RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§395, 497 (1934); Wilson, Products Liability Part II
The Protection of the Producing Enterprise, 43 CAuF. L. Ray. 809 (1955).28 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., supra note 15.
19 See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Sharoff, 202 F.2d 52 (10th Cir.
1953) ; Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., 167 App. Div. 433, 153 N.Y. Supp. 131
(3d Dep't 1915); cases cited note 17 supra. Contra, Judson Pacific-Murphy,
Inc. v. Thew Shovel Co., 127 Cal. App. 2d 828, 275 P.2d 841 (App. Dep't
1954), 2 U.C.L.A.L. Ray. 293 (1955). However, the Judson decision has been
severely criticized. See Thornton & McNiece, Torts, 1955 Annual Survey of
American Law, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 344, 362 (1956).
20 See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050,
1053 (1916); PROSsaa, TORTS § 84, at 499-500 (2d ed. 1955); Thornton &
McNiece, supra note 19, at 362.
21 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. Sup.
Ct. 1944) (concurring opinion); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456,
19561
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MacPherson case was to impose a greater duty on the manufacturer.2 2
Many other jurisdictions no longer require privity in their liberal
extensions of liability.28  New York, however, which originally ex-
tended liability,24 now seems reluctant to follow the modern trend by
not imposing a greater duty on the manufacturer. 25 Today the manu-
facturer engages in widespread advertising to promote his product,
derives the ultimate economic benefit from its sale, and is in a better
position financially to sustain a fhss than is the ultimate consumer.
26
The manufacturer also has available liability insurance on which he
may rely to protect himself in such instances.27 For these reasons
his liability should not be made to rest on an archaic rule that is
unsound in principle and produces unjust results.2 8
The instant case, in denying recovery for negligence, suggested
warranty as the mode of recovery.2 9 This also requires privity so that
a suit could only be maintained against the immediate vendor.8 0 It
is suggested that a sounder rule would be to finally repudiate the
necessity of privity in a negligence action against the manufacturer as
has been done in England and various American jurisdictions.8 1
12 P.2d 409 (1932) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 84, at 506 (2d ed. 1955) ; James, Products
Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 44 (1955); Miller, Liability Of A Manufacturer
For Harm Done By A Product, 3 SYRACUSE L. REv. 106, 126 (1951).
22 See note 6 supra.
23 See note 21 supra; Maryland Gas Co. v. Independent Metal Products Co.,
203 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1953); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. United States, 69 F.
Supp. 609 (S.D. Me. 1947); Ketterer v. Armour & Co,, 200 Fed. 322 (S.D.N.Y.
1912), aff'd, 247 Fed. 921 (2d Cir. 1917); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27
Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557, 560 (1928). For some of the reasons why privity
was required, see note 1 supra; Curtain v. Somerset, 140 Pa. St. 70, 21 Ati. 244,
245 (1891) (dictum).
24 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra note 20.
25 Cf. H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896
(1928); Bohlen, Liability Of Manufacturers To Persons Other Than Their
Immediate Vendees, 45 L.Q. REv. 343 n.1 (1929).
26 See Ketterer v. Armour & Co., supra note 23; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1944) (concurring opinion); Baxter
v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932); Friedmann, Social
Insurance And The Principles Of Tort Liability, 63 HAv. L. Rzv. 241, 243-44
(1949).
27 See Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Underwriters At Lloyd's, 177
F.2d 249 (7th Cir. 1949) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 84, at 506 (2d ed. 1955) ; Patterson,
The Apportionment Of Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 CoLUM. L.
Rxv. 335 (1924).
28 See Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946).
29 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 148 N.Y.S.2d
284 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
30 Turner v. Edison Storage Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 161 N.E. 423 (1928);
Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923); see Ryan v.
Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
31 See Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946); Carter v.
Yardley & Co., supra note 28; Donoghue v. Stevenson, [19321 A.C. 562.
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